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M O R E T H A N A D E C A D E A G O in Beyond Formalism Geoffrey 
Hartman warned Anglo-American criticism of the pitfalls of 
prostrating itself before formalist textual analysis: "The domi-
nation of textual Exegesis is great : she is our Whore of Babylon, 
sitting robed in Academic black on the great dragon of Criticism, 
and dispensing a repetitive and soporific balm from her pedantic 
cup." 1 If literary studies in North America survived this Dunciad 
of a residual New Criticism, the seventies offered them little respite 
and no solace. The new threat, as Hartman puts it in Criticism in 
the Wilderness, seems even more ominous, a kind of Jacobean 
science fiction onslaught from across the Atlantic: "The 1970 's 
have seen an invasion of mind-snatchers from the Continent" (p. 
9 ) . 2 And there can be no doubt that the renewed interest in 
theory and theorizing, the profusion of introductions to struc-
turalism and deconstruction, of translations, testify to the sub-
stance of Hartman's observation. In Criticism in the Wilderness 
he hints that if North American criticism has crossed its red sea 
of formalism, it has yet to discover its own identity, to develop 
the confidence of its own (unborrowed) set of premises and 
critical practice. 
It is precisely here that the initial project of Beyond Formalism 
is immobilized. In spite of its Dunciad invocation Beyond For-
malism did not posit a critical displacement, a radical reversal, of 
the methodology and organizing categories American New Criti-
cism had developed. Instead, it took its place among the inter-
texts of conciliation — Coleridge introducing German Idealism 
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to English criticism, Mi l l on Bentham and Coleridge, T . H . 
Green on Hegel — suggesting that Cleanth Brooks may not be 
enough of a formalist and that the phenomenological criticism 
of Georges Poulet may be "more formalistic than he thinks, and 
that where he is less so his work may fail to situate the writer."3 
The enterprise of literary criticism, then, was not so much to 
move beyond formalism, but to move through it, incorporating 
its close reading of the text with the exploration of its dense 
multiple realities foregrounded by Geneva School phenomeno-
logical criticism. 
Such a reconciliation was to be facilitated by the general 
tendency of both American formalism and phenomenological 
criticism to stress 'wholeness' as an organizing concept. Thus, 
Hartman could argue that the premature false universality which 
he discovers in Poulet's criticism ("substituting a perplexity of 
representation for one of being")4 could be tempered by the 
close analysis, the detailed textual 'whole,' formalism offered. 
The rapprochment envisaged between formalist and phenomeno-
logical criticism was one in which the narrow textual analyses of 
American critics would be enriched by the effort to grasp the 
synthetic intent of European philosophical criticism. In turn, the 
so-called abstraction of the Continental critics would rediscover 
textual specificity through its engagement with American for-
malism. 
But it was not to be. With the exception of a few seminal works 
(think, for instance, of J . Hillis Miller's The Disappearance of 
God or Poets of Reality) the influence of Poulet's Geneva School 
phenomenology has remained on the periphery of North Ameri-
can literary studies. The pressuring European influence in the 
decade of the seventies has come instead from Parisian structural-
ism, and, its post-structuralist variant, deconstruction. And 
through them, ironically, North American criticism, according to 
Hartman, continues to find itself in an impasse. Today the 
dilemma is not so much the inability to move beyond textual 
exegesis but the difficulty of defining a critical stance, a self-
identity for North American criticism, amid the multiplying 
interplay of signifiers, referents, Derridean puns and competing 
codes. 
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In the very act of stumbling into the wilderness, however, criti-
cism is endowed with an extraordinary resilience. It is released 
from the rigidity of New Criticism's textual readings, of Leavis' 
ethical touchstone, or of Frye's quest for a science of interpreta-
tion. In Hartman's words: 
One thing we have learned : whatever style of critical inquiry 
may be evolving today, criticism cannot be identified as a branch 
of science or as a branch of fiction. Science is strongest when it 
pursues a fixed paradigm or point of reference, however subtly 
modified, however self-transformed. Fiction is strongest as pro-
phetic discourse, as prophecy, after the event — an event con-
stituted or reconstituted by it, and haunted by the idea of trau-
matic causation ("A sudden blow," "A shudder in the loins"). 
But contemporary criticism aims at a hermeneutics of indeter-
minacy. It proposes a type of analysis that has renounced the 
ambition to master or demystify its subject (text, psyche) by 
technocratic, predictive, or authoritarian formulas, (pp. 40-41) 
Criticism is emancipated from the strictures imposed by directing 
itself merely towards elucidating what is contained within the 
text. It becomes a creative act in itself. Just as Barthes has pole-
micized for a disruptive rereading which would prevent the 
"meaning" in the text from simplified appropriation into the 
reader's consciousness,5 so Hartman wishes to underscore in 
literary criticism a creative dimension which would release it 
from the restraints of a self-imposed methodology. It is in this 
free development that literary criticism encounters the conditions 
and first outline of its future prospective form. 
Previous critical reflections can no longer be seen to function 
as "parts" of a mechanical aggregate which eventually attains 
"truth" or an absolute explication of the essential meaning of 
the text. Certainly, existing critical commentary is seen to be 
incomplete, but it is this very discontinuous quality which allows 
the metacritic to install himself within its rifts and fractures so 
that he begins to see anew not only the critic and his perception 
but also the text and author. This is precisely the typical intel-
lectual procedure at work in Hartman's discussion of Walter 
Benjamin. According to Hartman, Benjamin's study of Baude-
laire exists under two indissoluble and complementary aspects: 
a secular phase and a religious phase. Neither is complete in 
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itself; each makes references ("quotes" is his word) to the other, 
but without achieving totality. Yet it is within the interplay of 
the two phases that the critic has access to Benjamin's critical 
practice: "What remains of this foundering motion is, neverthe-
less, powerful and symptomatic : the project, even in its dejected 
form, illustrates the relation between language and life" (p. 7 4 ) . 
Further, what is revealed in the metacommentary on Benja-
min's Baudelaire is not only the configurations of the original 
critic's discourse, but the poet. On these terms the fissures in 
Benjamin's writings yield a revitalized vision of Baudelaire who 
can now be evaluated through the refraction of Benjamin's own 
commentary. At this point critical examination of Benjamin's 
thought becomes an exercise in the retrieval of Baudelaire's texts: 
"How strange, then, that Benjamin did not use this sonnet to 
illustrate . . . " ; "Benjamin could have pointed o u t . . . " (p. 6 9 ) . 
Or, to put it another way, Hartman on Benjamin on Baudelaire 
becomes Hartman on Baudelaire. Such an enabling device ought 
not to suggest that criticism is merely to supply the metacritic's 
conduit back to the text. Metacritic, critic and poet are engaged 
in a complex interplay where each stimulates (one is tempted to 
use Hartman's "quotes") the discourse of the other. 
Exactly here, in the insistence that criticism must embrace 
reciprocity and indeterminacy, must refuse the temptation to 
close off such interplay, lies its "critical" dimension. According 
to Hartman, literature breaks loose from any critical endeavour 
to interpret it through an imposed system or grid : "art slanders 
an established order, good or bad, by not conforming. Its very 
existence is often a resistance, it gives the lie to every attempt to 
impose a t r u t h . . . " (p. 9 8 ) . Any pressure from criticism to 
make the text surrender up its meaning to a rigid schematism is 
bound to fail for the text will reply with stubborn indeterminacy. 
Criticism must welcome indeterminacy, however scandalous it 
may seem: "There is no absolute knowledge but rather a textual 
infinite, an interminable web of texts or interpretations; and the 
fact that we discern periods or sentences or genres or individual 
outlines or unities of various kinds is somewhat like computing 
time. We can insist that time has a beginning and an end; or, 
more modestly, the Romanticism, for example, began circa 1770 
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and ended circa 1 8 3 0 ; but this is a silly if provoking mimicry of 
providential or historical determinism" (p. 2 0 2 ) . Faced with the 
stringency of an apriori periodization which seeks to confine it 
Romanticism draws our attention to its fitful existence outside 
those boundaries: a Baudelaire? a Rilke? a Yeats? 
In his insistence on indeterminacy, on inter-textuality, on what 
we might call the disintegration of traditional categories of 
literary analysis — genre, periodization, even the text itself — 
Hartman reverses the conceptual priorities of conventional 
literary and cultural theory. The tradition in criticism from 
Matthew Arnold to I. A . Richards to Northrop Frye had always, 
in various forms, stressed culture's wholeness and unity. From 
Arnold's initial formulation in Culture and Anarchy, through 
Richards' "storehouses of recorded values" through Leavis' Great 
Tradition to Frye's autonomous literary universe, culture was 
perceived as something to be apprehended in its wholeness, as an 
entity which had defined itself apart from the contingency of 
lived experience. Indeed, it was in the very separation of culture 
from society that it could preserve its ethical impetus : no matter 
how fragmented, how atomized lived experience was perceived 
to be, the realm of culture preserved a vision of unity and indi-
visibility where human possibilities could find their realization. 
So Frye can insist that "the goal of ethical criticism is transvalu-
ation, the ability to look at contemporary social values with the 
detachment of one who is able to compare them in some degree 
with the infinite vision of possibilities presented by the culture."6 
Within such an interpretive model the critic — often the ideal 
reader — functions as a mediation between the region of culture, 
or its immediate representative, the text, and a debased and 
fallen reality. Put most simply, culture interrogates the fragmen-
tation of lived experience with its vision of wholeness. 
This critical perspective, so deeply held by the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition, was turned on its head by post-structuralist and 
deconstructivist polemics. The text, they argued, resists the arti-
ficiality of closure, inscribing within itself the very fractures and 
fissures which make unity impossible. Thus conceived, the text 
can no longer be an apriori transparent to the mind of the 
reader. On the contrary, its indeterminacy precludes any act of 
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simplified appropriation by the reader's consciousness, precipi-
tating instead a plurality of "readings." Here deconstruction 
shifts the canon of overall co-ordinates which foreground literary 
texts: Shelley, displaced to the periphery by Leavis' critique of 
Romanticism and Brooks' preference for the well-wrought image 
patterns of Keats, regains a central position as a poet of desire. 
The project of Criticism in the Wilderness is to bring together 
the continental and Anglo-American traditions: Benjamin and 
Derrida stand face to face with Leavis and Frye. The confronta-
tion is one in which Hartman sees each released from the confines 
of its peculiar tradition into a speculative interplay of critical 
creativity : 
[criticism's] speculative instruments are now exercising their 
own textual powers rather than performing, explaining, or reify-
ing existing texts. What is happening is neither an inflation of 
criticism at the expense of creative writing nor a promiscuous 
intermingling of both. It is, rather, a creative testing and illumi-
nation of limits: the limits of what Hegel called "absolute knowl-
edge" and Dewey the "quest for certainty." (pp. 201-02) 
The juxtaposition of Hegel and Dewey points to a central diffi-
culty of such an eclectic approach, or "critical pluralism."7 To 
be sure, the thought of Dewey and Hegel may be seen, in the 
most general sense, as forms of idealism. What is absent, how-
ever, is a notion of a critical consciousness loyal to the specifica 
differentia of the two systems. Criticism must found itself on a 
concept of truth which calls into question such unexamined 
eclecticism. To amalgamate syncretically what may be specific 
and unique ideas, concepts, systems of thought is ultimately to 
discredit each one. The result is to centre on superficial resem-
blances between forms of thought, liquidating in the process the 
particular differences within each. 
The point I am making can be focused by looking at the rela-
tionship of Criticism in the Wilderness to Frye's thought. Indeed, 
Hartman's project appears deeply inscribed with Frygean motifs : 
the romance quest, the wandering in the wilderness, the desire 
for epiphany. And, both critics evoke Matthew Arnold again 
and again. Yet it is exactly here, in the density of Arnold's 
thought that their divergences appear. For Frye, the privileged 
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moment of the Arnoldian text is its vision of possibilities: in the 
final chapter of The Anatomy of Criticism, literature finds its 
raison d'être in its ability to image a world which would be "free, 
classless and urbane." For Hartman, however, Arnold is signifi-
cant, not in his evocation of a promised land, but in his recogni-
tion of the circuitous journey : 
. . . Arnold ends "The Function of Criticism" by foreseeing a new 
epoch of creativity that the movement of modern criticism will 
usher in. "There is the promised land, toward which criticism 
can only beckon. That promised land will not be ours to enter, 
and we shall die in the wilderness: but to have desired to enter 
it, to have saluted it from afar, is already perhaps the best dis-
tinction among contemporaries." To which one can only reply: 
Ah, Wilderness. It is precisely that purely functional notion of 
criticism, or that great divide between criticism and creation, 
which is now in dispute, (p. 204) 
Whereas Frye, like Arnold, would underscore the shaping of 
future possibilities, Hartman reinvents the wilderness, now seen 
not as a place of discontent, but as a journey of creation. 
The comparison goes still further. On the one side, Frye's 
orientation towards the end, the telos, of literary criticism codifies 
criticism as a science of literary studies. On the other, Hartman's 
insistence on the creative dimension of criticism inscribes indeter-
minacy into the division between literature and literary studies. 
Thus, merely to invoke in a rhetorical gesture the points of con-
vergence between Frye and Hartman, without analyzing the 
uniqueness of each project would represent a premature general-
ization and, more crucially, would occlude the specific differ-
ences between the two critics. 
Still, there is a moment of truth in Hartman's insistence on 
indeterminacy, on interplay, on the refusal to define the boun-
daries between literature and criticism. If, in Leavis' Great 
Tradition or Frye's universe of archetypes, the act of writing is 
an act of vol (theft of the tradition, theft of the mythological 
archetype), in Criticism in the Wilderness Hartman reminds us 
that vol also means flight, the desire to soar, to break through 
the network of grids which competing interpretive systems im-
pose on criticism. In the refusal of authoritarian systematizing, 
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in its embracing of indeterminacy, criticism becomes an act of 
vol-ition, a process of desire. 
There is perhaps no critical perspective which has been accused 
more of imposing a rigid determinism on the text than psycho-
analytic criticism. Traditionally, psychoanalytic investigations of 
literary texts have taken two directions: to "analyze" the author, 
locating in his subjective neuroses the peculiarities of the text or 
to apply the insights of psychoanalysis to the text itself, using 
Freudian codes (Oedipal conflict, repression, phallic symbols) to 
interpret it. In either of these approaches psychoanalytic criticism 
appropriates to itself a privileged interpretive position, subordi-
nating and censoring — one is tempted to say "repressing" — 
the plenitude of the text. Yet psychoanalysis itself has recently 
been subjected to a series of critiques which parallel the develop-
ments in post-structuralist literary criticism. 
The first of these interrogations comes from the work of writers 
such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.8 Psychoanalysis, they 
argue, far from constituting a process of emancipation for the 
human subject, is instead a process of enthrallment. The multi-
plicity of human experience is rewritten in terms of "family" 
history: within psychoanalysis, the entirety of an individual's 
history is interpreted through the authority of the Oedipal 
moment. Thus Deleuze and Guattari polemicize for a liberation 
of the human subject into the "flux and flows" of what they call 
schizo-analysis. And, like the post-structuralists, they focus on 
texts which break down the authoritarianism of a dominating 
narrative perspective: Joyce, the nouveau roman, Faulkner. 
A second reinterpretation of Freud has developed in the writ-
ings of Jacques Lacan. With its basis in structuralist linguistics 
Lacanian psychoanalysis has a direct relation to literary criticism. 
For Lacan language is a field where the human subject not only 
lives out his or her own repression, but also discovers a project 
of emancipation: "I identify myself in Language, but only by 
losing myself in it like an object."9 The Fictional Father is a 
collection of essays, edited by Robert Con Davis, which explores 
Lacanian readings of the text. 
According to Lacanian criticism, literature represents an aspect 
of the "imaginary" to be distinguished from the "symbolic." 
I N D E T E R M I N A N C Y , I R R E D U C I B I L I T Y A N D A U T H O R I T Y 81 
While the symbolic corresponds to the arbitrary relationship of 
signifier and referent in language, the imaginary retains elements 
of free association and play. Yet the imaginary is never merely a 
realm of the fictional or the illusory. Instead, it takes its reference 
from that stage in which the infant perceives its reflection in the 
mirror and grasps its identity as a unity. The moment of the 
imaginary, according to Lacan, facilitates the development of an 
Ego Ideal. Yet this sense of wholeness far from stable : 
. . . this unity in the Imaginary is always threatened by absence 
(of the mother, of objects) and by difference (the absence or 
presence of the penis). Language is a way of repressing or con-
trolling this difference and absence by putting it on the plane of 
representations. For Lacan, the fact of difference is in the Real, 
conceived as a stage of the subject rather than as an external 
reality, and its representation/repression/control takes place in 
the Symbolic.10 
These formulations have particular implications for literary texts. 
It is within the text that the desire to reconstitute the Imaginary 
plays out its struggle with the pressuring, repressing and domi-
nating force of the Symbolic system of language. Put into Hart-
man's terms, this moment would parallel the text's resistance to 
any one-dimensional grid (the Symbolic) and its stubborn insis-
tence on multiple indeterminacy (the Imaginary). The applica-
tion of Lacanian psychoanalysis to literary analysis in the essays 
which make up The Fictional Father redirects criticism away 
from any concentration on repression in the author's conscious-
ness back to the text. 
Thus, Regis Durand's analysis of Melville, " 'The Captive 
King' : The Absent Father in Melville's Text," sees the failure of 
Redburn's guidebook as a failure of parental authority to pro-
vide new knowledge and discovery, and, ultimately "a discreet 
but powerful subversion of fictional convention" (p. 5 4 ) . The 
critical cutting edge of the subversive moment, however, cannot 
be sustained and the domination of the Symbolic asserts its 
power: "Narrative discourse then takes over firmly (the dis-
course one could accurately call dominant, because it dominates 
in several ways : psychically, inasmuch as it represses, it is repres-
sion itself; ideologically, inasmuch as it provides the norm, the 
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expected, acceptable form . . . ) " (p. 5 4 ) . The fractures and rifts 
in Melville's writings interrogate the notion of paternity, of an 
essential origin, while the conventions of the narrative code 
attempt to reimpose a controlling order: "Such are Melville's 
hieroglyphics: traces of countless little acts of creation, of cleav-
ings and fractures. What all this amounts to is the impossibility 
of a single origin and the challenge to the very idea of paternity" 
(P-59)-
The struggle of the text, then, is to constitute itself anew, to 
squeeze out its own identity from the controlling authority and 
domination of narrative codes and literary conventions. Yet 
because the text can never exist as something radically unique, 
cannot come into being without those codes (and conventions), 
without its "fictional father," it inscribes within itself the traces 
of this struggle. As Robert Con Davis quotes approvingly from 
Donald Barthelme: "the father is a motherfucker" (p. 1 7 8 ) . 
In one important sense, the analyses in The Fictional Father 
reverse Hartman's emphasis in Criticism in the Wilderness. Ac-
cording to Davis, the interaction within the text among repressive 
codes and the desire to escape from authority is a conflict from 
which the text can never emerge unmarred : "all narratives must 
in some sense fail" (p. 1 8 7 ) . For Hartman, on the other hand, 
the indeterminacy within the text, which in turn is rewritten into 
the project of literary criticism, guarantees and preserves a play-
fulness, an escape from authority (the authority of one critical 
system, of one interpretive ploy). 
The critic at the centre of these debates is Jacques Derrida. 
Positions, a series of interviews with Derrida about his central 
works — Grammatology, Writing and Difference — provides not 
only a commentary on his own thought, but also suggests the 
direction of his current work. A seminal implication of the de-
constructivist critique of substantialist thought, essentialist origins 
and a privileged system of interpretation has been its tendency 
toward radical relativism. If all readings are misreadings, then 
the critic is caught in a debilitating paralysis. In Positions, 
Derrida speaks to this dilemma : 
In effect, we must avoid having the indispensable critique of a 
certain relationship to the signified or the referent, to sense or 
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meaning, remain fixed in a suspension, that is, a pure and simple 
suppression, of meaning or reference. . . . What we need is to 
determine otherwise, according to a differential system, the 
effects of ideality, of signification, of meaning, and of reference, 
(p. 66) 
Derrida's stress here is not so much on the infinite interplay of 
signifiers, but on the definition of the precise contours in which 
that interplay takes place. While the critic must still refuse the 
authoritarianism of defining a privileged interpretive code, his 
focus is turned toward what resists the pluralistic interplay of 
signifiers, what, in Derrida's words, makes up the "fringe of 
irreducibility" (p. 6 7 ) . 
There can be no doubt that Derrida does not intend a return 
to the structured ambiguities of New Criticism. Yet the renewed 
emphasis on irreducibility suggests a reappraisal of infinite inde-
terminacy. Criticism turns its gaze not on the unity of the text, 
nor on its (uncensored) playfulness, but rather on the inter-
action of the two, on the ways in which the text inscribes within 
itself the conflicting demands of desire and control. 
The extent to which the new theorizing represents a moment 
of emancipation for the critic is clear. Gone is the authoritarian 
domination of a particular interpretation: a new dimension of 
playfulness, of punning, has opened up. Yet a disturbing question 
remains: is there a pedagogical efficacy to the new theories? 
Hartman ends Criticism in the Wilderness with an impassioned 
plea for a new interdisciplinary emphasis, for the emancipatory 
engagement of the arts with those professional disciplines still 
enthralled within the hierarchical systems of their own particular 
grid. Derrida is more cautious, but he too envisages a radical 
interrogation of those intellectual systems that ground themselves 
in authoritarian hierarchies: 
What is produced in the current trembling is a re-evaluation 
of the relationship between the general text and what was 
believed to be, in the form of reality (history, politics, economics, 
sexuality, etc. ), the simple, referable exterior of language or writ-
ing, the belief that this exterior could operate from the simple 
position of cause or accident. What are apparently simply "re-
gional" effects of this trembling, therefore, at the same time have 
a non-regional opening, destroying their own limits and tending 
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to articulate themselves with the general scene, but in new modes, 
without any pretention to mastery, (p. 91 ) 
It would be precisely in this "non-regional" opening up that 
criticism would recapture its cutting edge, so long discarded as 
an affective fallacy. Such a Utopian vision would reinvent Shel-
ley's project of desire: the critic deconstructs not only texts, but 
also worlds. 
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